Polish farmers’ organisations yesterday ended a blockade of Ukrainian agricultural exports that has dragged on for months (see here and here). The farmers were promised subsidies from the Polish government and a system of checks to ensure the goods are transited through Poland to other destinations. But many of the tensions underlying the protests remain. This guest post by EVA GELINSKY (written in March, while the blockade was in place) explains the background.
Farmers across Europe have been protesting for months – and although the protests are dying down in many places, partly due to seasonal factors, further actions can be expected. In eastern Europe, protests and blockades are continuing, and these are primarily directed against agricultural imports from Ukraine.
Demonstrations, strikes and blockades by farmers in Europe are not a new phenomenon. Since the beginning of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), i.e. for more than 60 years, there have always been fierce protests.
Despite several deep-going reforms, the fundamental aim of European Union (EU) agricultural policy is still to orientate agriculture and supply towards the standards of industrial capitalist production and the global agricultural market.
Because this structural change has a serious impact on farms and the environment, complicated new measures and regulations have been introduced time and again, for decades. These are intended to steer structural change in a regulated manner, cushion the hardships that arise and minimise the worst environmental damage.
Even if this policy of “grow or die” forces many farms to give up, and drives others into debt, the result is extremely successful: even after the UK’s withdrawal, the EU is (as of 2022) the second largest agricultural trading power in the world (after China and ahead of the USA).
In all EU countries where protests are taking place, many farmers criticise the environmental requirements of the “Green Deal” and the excessive bureaucracy associated with the CAP regulations.
In eastern Europe, there is another reason for the protests: trade liberalisation between the EU and Ukraine, and the consequences for farms.
Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, which has been going on for more than two years, is therefore not only having an impact on global agricultural commodity trade, but also on agriculture in the EU.
As the example of Poland shows, the resulting economic upheaval and protests are increasingly playing into the hands of right-wing populist forces. Russian propaganda is now also heavily involved.
Chronology of an escalation
Russia’s war of aggression has a massive impact on the Ukrainian economy. Already in the first weeks after the all-out invasion in February 2022, exports in particular were severely affected, as the Ukrainian Black Sea ports, which accounted for 90% of grain and oilseed exports before 2022, are blockaded by the Russian navy.
Wheat prices skyrocketed, with a corresponding impact on global food markets. In May 2022, the EU Commission presented an action plan for solidarity corridors – alternative logistics routes by rail, road and water. These corridors run from the Polish-Ukrainian border to the ports on the Baltic Sea, among other places.
In addition, all outstanding customs duties on imports from Ukraine under the Association Agreement concluded between the EU and Ukraine in 2014 were temporarily abolished.
Farmers took to the streets in Poland in July 2022, and the protests continued for weeks. One reason for their protests was imports of cheap grain from Ukraine.
What was actually intended as a transit route for Ukrainian agricultural products only worked in part. Some of the goods return to the Polish market, depressing prices or blocking storage capacity instead of being transported out of the country.[1]
The previous Polish government, which supported the protests (also for election campaign reasons), then imposed an import ban, unilaterally and without consulting the EU Commission, which is actually responsible for trade policy. (The right wing Law and Justice party lost control of the government in the October 2023 elections.)
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia followed suit, and closed their borders to Ukrainian agricultural products.
Only after tough negotiations did the EU Commission manage to negotiate a compromise that provided for compensation payments in return for a time limit on the import bans.
When Poland and several other eastern European countries let the deadline pass in autumn 2023 and refused to lift the import ban, Ukraine took a case against Poland, Hungary and Slovakia to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The dispute came to a head when president Zelensky criticised Poland at the UN for its lack of solidarity. Warsaw then summoned the Ukrainian ambassador and prime minister Morawiecki even questioned certain arms deliveries in an interview.
Despite this verbal exchange of blows, Polish politicians did not fundamentally question their support for Ukraine.
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who was still head of government at the time, is quoted as saying: “We want to support Ukraine in the war and in its reconstruction, but at the same time we have to think about our citizens, our agriculture and our villages. Our Ukrainian friends should understand that.”
The tone is often much harsher and more irreconcilable at the farmers’ protests, especially on the border with Ukraine.
Polish farmers’ protests – targeted by Russian propaganda
In January of this year, when farmers in other EU countries also took to the streets, farmers in Poland once again began blockading the border crossing to Ukraine in order to exert pressure on Donald Tusk’s new government.
In Poland, as in other European countries, not only the demands but also the protest movement itself are very heterogeneous.
It includes pro-government groups such as AgroUnia and the chambers of agriculture; some sectors organised in trade union umbrella organisations such as the OPZZ (e.g. from the transport industry); populist and right-wing farmers’ associations; as well as numerous newly formed local protest committees in which independent farmers have joined forces.
A large demonstration in Warsaw recently showed just how divided the movement is: speeches by farmers’ representatives, regardless of their political affiliation, were drowned out by noise and shouting, with many groups accusing each other of trying to undermine and divide the protests.
The role of the far right is now unmistakable. For example, representatives of the Konfederacja party alliance are present at many farmers’ blockades. The Konfederacja Korony Polskiej (Confederation of the Polish Crown) alliance led by Grzegorz Braun, which is known for its anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian, anti-Semitic, homophobic and contrarian views, plays an important role here.
Openly right-wing extremist banners are displayed at protests – for example, one with the slogan “Putin, create order in Ukraine, in Brussels and with our rulers”. Actions in which farmers dump Ukrainian grain onto the streets are met with widespread rejection by the Polish public and politicians.
Nevertheless, far-right agitation, fuelled by social media, is on the rise beyond the agricultural protests. Studies have recently confirmed that Poland is being targeted by Russian propaganda.[2]
In addition to fake accounts, which are used to further fuel polarisation and undermine solidarity with Ukraine, social media (in Poland, for example, the Facebook page MIR) also provide an echo chamber for anti-Ukrainian propaganda.
Wheat as a weapon
Brussels is currently discussing an extension of trade liberalisation for imports from Kyiv until June 2025. Protective measures are planned for “sensitive agricultural products”.
Is an end to the disputes in sight? Not likely. The transport of Ukrainian agricultural products to and through the EU is likely to remain important for the foreseeable future.
This is because the massive obstruction of Ukrainian transport routes is, alongside the destruction of land and agricultural infrastructure, the theft of machinery and Ukrainian grain, an important part of Russian warfare.
Since the end of the Black Sea Agreement (July 2023), Moscow has stepped up its military attacks on Ukrainian export facilities.
The attacks have damaged grain silos and infrastructure both in Ukrainian seaports and in the Danube ports on the border with Romania, which are an important alternative route for exports.
It is unclear whether Russia’s aim is to wipe out the Ukrainian agricultural sector completely, as experts believe. But certainly its attacks are massively weakening Ukraine, in this important sector as in others.
Meanwhile, another conflict is emerging in the EU border region, which is probably also part of Russia’s warfare: agricultural imports from Russia are entering the EU via the Baltic states and Belarus, which could lead to a further drop in the price of EU goods and further weaken Ukraine’s trade position.
Ukrainian trade minister Taras Kachka told the Financial Times at the beginning of March that Ukraine was prepared to accept temporary trade restrictions with the EU, if the EU imposed a ban on Russian grain imports. Latvia has already imposed such a ban, and Poland is also considering this step.
Russia is also trying to weaken Ukraine’s trading position on the global market.
On international markets, the share of Ukrainian wheat exports has shrunk from 9% to around 6% since the start of the war. In contrast, Russia’s share has risen from 16% to 22.5%.
Thanks to record harvests in 2022/2023, Russia – now the world’s largest wheat exporter – has been flooding the global market for several months and is trying to undercut competitors with low prices.
Analysts expect Ukraine’s wheat exports to fall by 3.7 million tonnes to 13.4 million tonnes in 2023-24, the lowest level in nine years. A significant reduction in global wheat supply could cause prices to rise again. And if wheat prices rise, Russia will be in a good position to benefit.
All these complexities – an EU agricultural policy that uses all means to transform agriculture into industrial capitalism, imperialist conflicts waged in the economic sphere and with propaganda, increasing social polarisation and the advance of fascism – bring difficult times to farmers in Ukraine, the EU and worldwide. And not only to them.
□ The author thanks Szymon Martys, political scientist and journalist from Poland, for his help
□ People & Nature thanks Eva Gelinsky for this analysis. It first appeared in the German monthly newspaper analyse & kritik (here), and has been translated with the help of DeepL.com. 30 April 2024.
[1]For a detailed analysis of grain prices, see here (in Polish)
[2]See also Politico: Europe’s farmer protests have been fertile ground for Russian propaganda
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